The Comparative Politics Seminar Series in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute is a venue for the presentation of work in progress by scholars from across the subfield of comparative politics.
It usually takes place on Thursdays from 17:00 to 18:30 at Seminar Room 2, in Badia Fiesolana (Fiesole). See below or sync the calendar for the exact location for each meeting. See previous events.
The series is organized by Elias Dinas, Simon Hix, Filip Kostelka, Sascha Riaz, Kevin Munger and Tasha Fairfield with support by Yana Bochkareva and John Michaelis.
Thursday 08 January 2026 | Seminar Room 2
The peculiar politics of antitrust in Latin America: Institution building and business backlash (2000-2020)
Policy change and institution building in antitrust in Latin America raise two main questions. First, how, in the space of only a decade (2006-2016), did 3 of the richest and largest countries – Brazil, Chile, and Mexico – build the strongest antitrust agencies and policies in the region? The answers lie mostly in international dissemination of law and best practices backed by foreign governments and firms. Second, how did big business fight back to reduce the power of these agencies? The answers here depend heavily on the varying political openings or vulnerabilities that allowed individual businesses to contest agency decisions or weaken agencies overall. These vulnerabilities arose mostly in the judiciary in Mexico and through electoral laws and campaign finance in Brazil. The political system in Chile had fewer such vulnerabilities.
Thursday 29 January 2026 | Seminar Room 2
Eligibility Uncertainty, Race, and Future Voting
Does a lack of information among minority citizens about whether they are eligible to register and vote in U.S. elections help explain the large and increasing racial turnout gap? In a context like the U.S. where registration and voting rules vary across states, a substantial number of Americans are likely to be deterred from voting because they think they are ineligible to register and vote. I argue that while the direct, short-term effect of such eligibility uncertainty on turnout is similar for White and minority Americans, long-term effects on future voting will be different. Not voting due to eligibility uncertainty in an earlier election will make minority Americans substantially less likely to vote in future elections than Whites, most likely by undermining their feelings of political efficacy. To test this theory, I focus on uncertainty among young Americans about whether someone needs to be 18 by the registration deadline or by Election Day to register and vote in U.S. elections. Drawing on voter file data from a large number of U.S. states and using a regression discontinuity design, I find evidence in support of my theory. Young Black Americans who do not vote in an earlier election due to eligibility uncertainty are substantially less likely to vote in future elections than young White Americans. Additional survey data provides suggestive evidence for political efficacy as a possible mechanism. At a time of heightened concerns around voter suppression, these findings highlight the need to pay more attention to restrictive voting legislations’ long-term effects on minority voter turnout.
Thursday 12 February 2026 | Seminar Room 2
Ballots and Budgets: The Fiscal Consequences of Franchise Extensions
Foundational political-economic theories predict that suffrage expansions should increase the tax burden, especially on the rich. However, this dynamic has proven difficult to find empirically. I argue that de facto elite control helps explain this gap: when elites are unified, they can block redistributive pressures even after democratizing reforms. In contrast, when elites are fragmented, suffrage expansion should affect taxes as expected. I test this insight by leveraging the uneven extension of suffrage in historical Norwegian municipalities, combining new data on local tax types and levels with detailed land-holding inequality. Consistent with the theory, areas with high inequality show negligible effects of suffrage on taxes, while more egalitarian areas see higher revenues and greater reliance on modern taxes, like income taxes. These findings contribute to a central debate in political economy: under which circumstances democratization affects taxation. But also to our understanding of how inter-elite dynamics can shape democratic outcomes.
Thursday 12 March 2026 | Seminar Room 2
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Thursday 26 March 2026 | Seminar Room 2
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Thursday 09 April 2026 | Seminar Room 2
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